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Abstract
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (”WTO”) will help open up the Chinese
market for European undertakings and will boost China’s role as a major partner of the European
Community. Accordingly, China’s accession primarily can be seen as a factor in liberalizing
Sino-European trade relations. China’s accession to the WTO also will cause this country to
lose progressively its “exception” status. As a result, Europe, on the one hand, will treat China
just like its other trading partners, while China, on the other hand, will benefit fully from its WTO
membership, not only with regard to its WTO obligations, but also to its WTO rights. Therefore,
China’s accession to the WTO can also be seen as a means of normalizing Sino-European trade
relations. The case of anti-dumping is particularly illustrative.
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INTRODUCTION
China's accession to the World Trade Organization1
("WTO") will help open up the Chinese market for European
undertakings and will boost China's role as a major partner of
the European Community. Accordingly, China's accession pri-
marily can be seen as a factor in liberalizing Sino-European
trade relations.
China's accession to the WTO also will cause this country to
lose progressively its "exception" status. As a result, Europe, on
the one hand, will treat Chinajust like its other trading partners,
while China, on the other hand, will benefit fully from its WTO
membership, not only with regard to its WTO obligations, but
also to its WTO rights. Therefore, China's accession to the WTO
can also be seen as a means of normalizing Sino-European trade
relations. The case of anti-dumping is particularly illustrative.
I. CHINA 'S ACCESSION TO THE WTO AS A FACTOR IN
LIBERALIZING SINO-EUROPEAN TRADE RELATIONS
A. A New Framework for Liberalizing Trade
The negotiations on China's accession already have led to a
substantial reduction in tariff barriers for numerous products.
China made a wide range of commitments in its November 1999
agreement with the United States.2 The European Community
has been able to build on this position through the Sino-EU
Agreement on China's Accession to the WTO3 ("Sino-EU Agree-
* Members of the Paris Bar Gide Loyrette Nouel
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144
(1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
2. Agreement on Market Access, Nov. 15, 1999, P.R.C.-U.S., reprinted in INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Mar. 15, 2000 [hereinafter U.S.-PRC Market Access Agreement].
3. See Clay Chandler, China Signs Accord with EU to Speed WTO Entry: Beijing Makes
Concessions to Clear Final Major Hurdle, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 20, 2000, at 1.
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ment"), obtaining further commitments on 150 products of spe-
cific interest to European exporters.
This reduction includes the abolition of tariff peaks that
block or severely restrict access to the Chinese market for certain
European products (e.g., automobiles, chemicals, agricultural
foodstuffs, and alcoholic drinks). Other spectacular reductions
were applied to other products. European exporters, therefore,
can expect real benefits with respect to these products. All spir-
its will be subject to a duty of 10% (the current rate is 65%),
electrical goods will be "0" rated by 2005, and a tariff of 25% will
apply to automobiles byJuly 1, 2006 (the current rate is between
80% and 100%). For numerous other products, including agri-
cultural products, exporters will see a direct benefit due to the
tariff commitments made by China.
China also has committed itself to a progressive abolition of
quotas limiting imports of certain products. This process already
will be achieved prior to accession for a small number of prod-
ucts (e.g., optical fibers and fertilizers) for the majority of prod-
ucts by 2002, and the remainder by 2005. During this short pe-
riod, the existing quotas will be increased year by year.
Other important improvements in trade liberalization must
be noted. After accession to the WTO, China cannot use import
or export licenses to control purchase volumes or, for exports, to
organize the sale of strategic products by controlling price levels.
A timetable for their withdrawal over three to five years has been
prepared based on negotiations with the various WTO Members.
In addition, China also has agreed to relax its State monopolies
channeling all Chinese imports and exports. For European ex-
porters, this means that they will no longer have to deal exclu-
sively through Chinese State importers. They will be able to sell
directly to other Chinese importers. For example, the Sino-EU
Agreement deregulates oil and fertilizers. These markets will be
progressively opened up to private traders. The deregulation of
certain exports (e.g., silk) will allow European companies to buy
directly from Chinese producers. European manufacturers will
be entitled to choose between different producers, instead of
paying the Chinese State export price.
Finally, it must be noted that China has offered commit-
ments in several service sectors that are important to European
undertakings. In the telecommunications sector, the Chinese
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commitments entitle foreign operators to acquire up to a 25%
interest in telephone service companies from the date of acces-
sion. The permitted holding will increase to 35% one year later
and to 49% three years after that. The Chinese authorities now
allow inter-city telecommunications, which means that telecom-
munications are no longer restricted to city-limits, which re-
present 75% of current telephone calls. Both sides in the negoti-
ations also succeeded in reaching a bilaterally acceptable agree-
ment for European investment in mobile telephone services.
Indeed, some European operators (France Telecom, Siemens/
Deutsche Telecom, and Telecom Italia) already had created
mixed telecommunications companies (China-China-Foreign)
with subsidiaries of China Unicom and made significant invest-
ments. These companies, however, were obliged suddenly to
cease their activities, because they were considered illegal by the
Chinese authorities. The negotiations resulted in a satisfactory
compensation package for these investments.
In the banking sector, the Chinese authorities have em-
barked upon a full reform. Consequently, the competition be-
tween Chinese and foreign banks, which currently represent
only 2% of the established financial institutions in China, is
likely to be improved. There are still difficulties in foreign banks
trading in Chinese currency. This situation should improve
slightly based on China's commitments under the Sino-EU
Agreement, which allow European financial undertakings in the
city of Zhuhai to transact in the local currency.
In the insurance sector, the Sino-EU Agreement grants
seven new licenses (two for damage insurance and five for life
insurance) to European companies. This should strengthen the
European position in China considerably. Currently, only four
European firms operate in the insurance sector. The new Euro-
pean undertakings concerned are still waiting for the licenses to
be attributed. Interpretation of China's commitment is uncer-
tain. The sticking point is whether these licenses are intended
only to extend the geographical scope of existing businesses or
whether they should be treated as totally independent. In any
case, the licenses should be attributed before China's accession
to the WTO. According to the new Sino-EU Agreement, Euro-
pean insurance companies also will be allowed progressively to
sell the same products as their Chinese competitors. Two years
after China's accession, the scope of these companies' businesses
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will be extended to health insurance, pensions, group life insur-
ance, and other insurance other than statutory insurance. China
also has committed itself to guaranteeing effective management
control for outside investors in life insurance joint ventures by
allowing them a 50% equity share and free choice of joint ven-
ture partners. From the date of accession, China has agreed to
allow the establishment of branches and 51% owned joint ven-
tures for non-life insurance. The establishment of wholly for-
eign-owned subsidiaries will be allowed two years following
China's accession. The reinsurance sector also will be opened
up fully to non-Chinese service providers from the date of acces-
sion.
Finally, in the distribution sector, China has committed it-
self to lifting the specific restriction on joint ventures that ap-
plies to large international retail stores greater than 20,000
square meters in size and to retail traders with more than thirty
outlets in China. Until now, the 50-50 "equity limit" that applied
to these categories of traders represented a significant restriction
on foreign investment in the distribution sector in China. China
also has granted the right for undertakings, backed by foreign
investment, to sell goods other than their own on the retail mar-
ket and to offer other services connected to distribution, such as
transportation, maintenance, repairs, and after sales services.
China, however, cannot comply fully with all of its WTO ob-
ligations from the very first day of its accession. The various tiers
of government in China, both at national and regional levels, are
likely to raise further difficulties regarding compliance with the
country's WTO obligations. It is clear, therefore, that the very
important commitments made by China during its accession ne-
gotiations alone will not be sufficient to open up the Chinese
market. Compliance also will have to be secured by way of other
separate instruments providing market access.
In this regard, European companies will have to play an ac-
tive role in ensuring that the expectations raised by China's ac-
cession to the multilateral trade system become tangible realities
and that these European companies obtain access to the enor-
mous potential of the Chinese market. This should be true par-
ticularly in the sanitary and phytosanitary sector ("SPS"), gov-
erned by the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
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Phytosanitary Measures4 ("SPS Agreement"), and in terms of
technical trade restrictions, which fall within the scope of the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade5 ("TBT Agreement").
The SPS Agreement establishes the rules that apply to mem-
bers wishing to impose national measures restricting trade for
reasons of health or the protection of human, animal, or plant
life. The SPS Agreement will bind China and will prevent the
Chinese authorities from misusing the grounds of health protec-
tion if it introduces national measures to restrict trade. It should
be noted that the use of scientific-based SPS standards by China
is a major concern for the European undertakings in the food-
stuff sector, particularly in the areas including meat, citrus, ap-
ples, potatoes, tomatoes, peppers, eggplant, cucumbers, and
growing media. For this reason, a specific agreement was
reached which applies the provisions of the SPS Agreement to
EU-China relations prior to China's accession to the WTO.
The other WTO agreement that will be of particular rele-
vance to European businesses is the TBT Agreement. The TBT
Agreement deals with national regulations involving technical
restrictions that might obstruct international trade. The TBT
Agreement sets forth the conditions whereby a member may
adopt technical regulations and standards, including packaging,
marking, or labeling requirements. Such regulations may not be
prepared, adopted, or applied with the aim or the effect of creat-
ing unnecessary obstacles to international trade and should not
be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate ob-
jective, such as public health or consumer or environmental pro-
tection. Examples of Chinese technical regulations constituting
obstacles to trade for European undertakings are numerous.
For instance, there is an administrative registration in sectors
such as chemicals and cosmetics, and a certain number of im-
ported products, such as car parts, boilers, and pressure vessels,
are submitted to safety inspections. Moreover, imports from Eu-
ropean countries are submitted to an "in loco inspection" in the
European factory, with the European undertaking responsible
for the traveling expenses. Another sector at the origin of corn-
4. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/
finale.htm.
5. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/final-e.htm.
CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE WTO
plaints from European producers is textiles and leather. Euro-
pean producers have to face quality and conformity controls, re-
quirements regarding the certification and the mutual recogni-
tion of products or marking, and labeling and packaging
requirements.
To ensure that European undertakings benefit in real terms
from China's accession to the WTO, there are several legal en-
forcement mechanisms available. These apply at both the Euro-
pean and the WTO level and require close cooperation between
European operators and public authorities. One of these mech-
anisms is the so-called "EC Trade Barrier Regulation."6 This
complaint-driven instrument provides a mechanism whereby
community firms, groups of firms, or industry associations may
take action against trade barriers obstructing their access to
third country markets or affecting their position in violation of
WTO provisions.
The role of the European Commission in the context of the
EC Trade Barrier Regulation is to investigate the case. It has a
prescribed time period (usually five months) to do so. The Eu-
ropean Commission will then seek redress. An investigation is
undertaken after consulting the fifteen Member States. Unless
there is strong opposition from various Member States, the Euro-
pean Commission is free to begin a proceeding. Following the
investigation, and in the absence of an amicable settlement, the
European Community is entitled to take action at the interna-
tional level, referring the case for resolution by a WTO dispute
settlement proceeding in Geneva. The main objective of the
TBT Agreement, however, is to reach a negotiated settlement of
the dispute through consultation before moving on to the panel
stage.
B. A New Policy to Encourage Foreign Investment
With regards to foreign investment and in the perspective of
its accession to the WTO, China is cleaning up its existing laws
and regulations governing foreign investment in order to com-
ply with the WTO requirements, especially the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures7 ("TRIMs"). According to
6. Council Regulation No. 3286/94, O.J. L 349/71 (1995).
7. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/finaLe.htm.
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the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
("MOFTEC"), there are currently six foreign-related economic
and trade laws (two concerning foreign trade and four concern-
ing foreign investment), forty-four regulations promulgated or
approved by the Chinese State Council, and 666 regulatory rules
issued by ministries or other central governmental administra-
tions in China. All of these laws and regulations must be
amended or abolished.
The workload, therefore, is enormous. Up to now, only two
new laws governing foreign-invested enterprises have been
amended. They are the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law
of the PRC8 and the Cooperative Joint Venture Law of the PRC,9
both of which were adopted October 31, 2000. Others are being
amended and are expected to be promulgated in the near fu-
ture. From an examination of the above-mentioned two laws, it
is clear that China is making an effort to comply with the re-
quirements of the WTO. Moreover, a series of new policies
aimed at encouraging foreign investment has recently been pub-
lished and will change significantly China's legislation on for-
eign investment.
China's new approach to foreign investment is to comply
with the requirements of TRIMs. One of the requirements of
TRIMs prohibits the use of all investment measures regarded as
having a distorting and adverse effect on trade in goods. In
China, this would include (i) measures requiring foreign-in-
vested enterprises to give preference to domestic supply instead
of international supply when purchasing raw materials, fuel, and
other materials, (ii) measures requiring a wholly foreign-owned
enterprise to utilize advanced technology and to export the ma-
jority of its annual production, (iii) measures requiring auto-bal-
ance in foreign currency, and (iv) measures controlling the pro-
duction and operation activities of foreign-invested enterprises.
Recently, Chinese legislators have made significant improve-
ments, as can be seen in the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise
Law of the PRC and the Cooperative Joint Venture Law of the
PRC. In these two new laws, the measures that are inconsistent
with TRIMs or that apply discriminatory investment standards
8. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGuo GUOWUYUAN GONGBAO [GAZETTE OF THE
STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], Jan. 30, 2001, at 11-12.
9. See id. at 7-9.
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have been amended or deleted. The new Wholly Foreign-
Owned Enterprise Law of the PRC, for example, has been
amended as follows:
" Before the amendments, this law required that enter-
prises "must benefit the development of China's national
economy and utilize advanced technology and equipment
or export all, or the majority of their products." This pro-
vision has been amended to read that enterprises "must
benefit the development of China's national economy.
The State encourages the founding of wholly foreign-
owned enterprises whose products are export-oriented or
involved in the high-tech field."
" The provisions concerning the control of production and
operational plans by relevant administrations have been
deleted.
* Regarding the procurement of raw materials, the new
Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law states that "[o]n
the basis of fairness and reasonableness, the raw materi-
als, fuel and other materials required by a wholly foreign-
owned enterprise which come within its authorized busi-
ness scope may be purchased within China or on the in-
ternational market." Before the law was amended, this
provision stated that the raw materials shall be procured
in the domestic market if the conditions are the same.
" The provisions regarding the balance in foreign currency
have been deleted.
The amendments of the Cooperative Joint Venture Law of
the PRC are similar to the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise
Law of the PRC. It is expected that relevant amendments also
will be made to the new Equity Joint Venture Law. As men-
tioned above, China's central governments recently have estab-
lished a series of new policies aimed at encouraging foreign in-
vestment. These policies cover the approval procedure, regional
incentive treatment, and the opening up of new sectors to for-
eign investors.
In accordance with the Opinion on further Encouraging
Foreign Investment, jointly promulgated by nine ministries and
central governmental administrations on August 20, 1999, the
government at the provincial level will approve any foreign in-
vestment project that does not need State approval. The State
20001
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Development Planning Commission and the State Economic
and Trade Commission also issued a circular on December 6,
1999, providing that all foreign investment projects in the de-
fined encouraged sectors will be approved by the provincial gov-
ernments. The old provisions that required MOFTEC approval
for foreign investment projects over US$30,000,000 have been
revised. MOFTEC, however, will continue to supervise the ap-
proval procedure in so far as MOFTEC requires the local author-
ities to send several documents to them, and MOFTEC retains
the power to disagree within one month after receipt of the rele-
vant documents.
There are two other points of particular interest: special in-
centives and investments in the retail and wholesale markets.
With regard to special incentives, China began its economic re-
form in the late 1970s; the Chinese coastal regions benefited
from more favorable treatment and incentives to encourage for-
eign investment. The Chinese government now has published
the incentive policies for the Central-Western Regions, which
cover the administrative regions of nineteen provinces, autono-
mous regions, and municipalities directly controlled by the cen-
tral government. The new policies include tax advantages given
to foreign investment enterprises and the opening up of sectors.
The new incentives include new methods that have never been
used before in China, even in the coastal regions. For example,
in accordance with the "Opinion on Further Encouraging For-
eign Investment" promulgated on August 20, 1999, a foreign-in-
vested enterprise (as well as a domestic enterprise) located in a
coastal region may enter into a contract with an enterprise in the
Central-Western Region.
With regard to the retail and wholesale markets, the Chi-
nese government has always limited investments in this sector.
Foreign investment started to flow into the retail and wholesale
markets in 1992 on a trial basis. Local governments approved
many foreign investment projects, given that local authorities
had approval rights for these projects. In 1997, the Chinese cen-
tral government carried out an investigation, and many of the
established enterprises failed to pass the inspection. Control of
the retail and wholesale sectors has been passed to the Chinese
central government since the inspection. The retail and whole-
sale sectors are two of the main concerns of the Sino-EU Agree-
ment. In accordance with the Sino-EU Agreement, the restric-
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tions will be gradually removed. On June 25, 1999, Measures on
the Trial of Foreign Investment in Merchandising Enterprises'"
("Merchandising Measures") were promulgated. Strictly speak-
ing, the Merchandising Measures regulate the activities of retail
and wholesale businesses with foreign investment, but in prac-
tice foreign investment related to this sector will also be affected.
This is particularly important for foreign investment enterprises,
since it gives them the ability to import and sell products for a
trial period in a new market. It will allow foreign producers to
establish a production structure according to market forces. In
order to engage in these activities, however, the foreign investors
are still required to meet many conditions. For example, they
can only take the form of either an equity joint venture or a
cooperative joint venture. Wholly foreign-owned enterprises re-
main temporarily prohibited; the enterprises cannot be estab-
lished in locations other than those determined by the Chinese
government. In order to be eligible, foreign investors must meet
certain requirements, which relate to economic capacity, man-
agement experience and sales techniques, the existence of an
international sales network, business reputation, the promotion
of Chinese exports, etc.
II. CHINA S ACCESSION TO THE WTO AS A MEANS OF
NORMALIZING SINO-EUROPEAN TRADE RELATIONS:
THE CASE OF ANTI-DUMPING
A. EC Anti-dumping and China: The End of the
"Chinese Exception"
Until recently, European anti-dumping legislation was de-
signed to deal with the lack of transparency in state-controlled
Chinese undertakings. As a result, the anti-dumping duty
charged by the European Commission applies to a given cate-
gory of Chinese products as a whole, according to the principle
"one country, one duty." The justification for this treatment was
the need to prevent the Chinese authorities from channeling the
majority of exports through the undertaking charged with the
lowest duty.
The Chinese transition and inherent reform of the public
10. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO DUIWAIJINGJI MAOYI HEZUO Bu WENGAO [GA-
ZETTE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA], July 5, 1999, at 9-12.
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sector and development of private undertakings, as well as the
perspective of China's accession to the WTO, have led the Euro-
pean Community to implement new mechanisms giving Chinese
undertakings the -same rights under certain circumstances as
those applied to market-economy undertakings. The evolution
in the European anti-dumping policy towards China began in
the early 1990s. Its aim in the long-term is to apply the "normal"
anti-dumping rules to all Chinese products.
This evolution first began at an "external" level. The Euro-
pean Community offered Chinese undertakings the opportunity
to demonstrate their independence from the Chinese State with
respect to the implementation of their export policies and
prices. Now, if an undertaking is able to prove that it is indepen-
dent, its export prices are taken as the basis for calculating an
individual anti-dumping duty. To ensure that the Chinese au-
thorities have no influence over the undertaking, the European
Commission asks producers/importers detailed questions re-
garding ownership, management, production control, and com-
mercial policy. The European Commission applied the follow-
ing criteria:
" Exporters are free to repatriate capital and profits (this
criterion applies to foreign-owned firms or joint ven-
tures).
" Export prices, quantities, and the terms and conditions of
sale must be set freely, and genuinely private companies
must own the majority of the shares. The number of Chi-
nese State officials who have seats on the board or who
are in key management positions should be in a clear mi-
nority. There is a presumption that a State controlled
company cannot guarantee its independence from State
intervention. It is up to the exporter to rebut this pre-
sumption.
" Exchange rate conversions must be at market rate.
* If exporters are allocated different rates of duty, State in-
tervention will not enable companies to circumvent mea-
sures taken by the European Commission.
In 1998, the European Community allowed Chinese under-
takings to determine a product's "normal value," taking into ac-
CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE WTO
count the price or cost of production/marketing in China.11
Unless an undertaking proves that its production and marketing
process takes place in a market-economy environment, analogy
with a reference country is no longer used. In order for a Chi-
nese undertaking to benefit from market-economy status, the
European Commission also applies a set of criteria to verify
whether the undertaking is operating in market-economy condi-
tions. These criteria are as follows:
" the company's decisions are made without significant Chi-
nese State intervention, according to market signals;
" its accounts must be independently audited in line with
international accounting standards;
" the company's production costs and financial position
must not be affected by distortions left over from the for-
mer Chinese State-controlled economy, by barter trade,
or by offsetting debt;
" the company is subject to bankruptcy and property law;
and
" exchange rate conversions are at market rates.
Until now it has been very difficult for Chinese undertak-
ings to get granted market-economy status. Until April 2000,
only three out of twenty-seven Chinese applicants were allowed
to benefit from this treatment. These undertakings were wholly-
owned foreign subsidiaries of companies established outside
China. For example, last December, the European Community
granted market-economy status to a compact disk box producer.
In this case, the European Commission recognized that the Chi-
nese undertaking indeed did operate under market-economy
conditions, particularly because the controlling Hong Kong-
based company made all of its decisions concerning prices, com-
ponents, technology, sales, and investments without any inter-
vention by the Chinese authorities. 12 In general, the European
Commission principally refuses to grant market-economy status
to Chinese undertakings because there is too much State inter-
vention in decision-making, the companies' accounts are not au-
11. See Council Regulation No. 2402/98, O.J. L 298/1 (1998) (imposing a defini-
tive anti-dumping duty on imports of unwrought unalloyed magnesium originating in
the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional duty im-
posed).
12. See Commission Regulation No. 2563/1999, O.J. L310/1 (1999).
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dited according to international standards, and the undertak-
ings' financial positions are distorted due to inaccurate valuation
of assets transferred to the company from the State and barter
trade.
The new European anti-dumping policy is likely to have sig-
nificant consequences for both Chinese and European produc-
ers who are competing with Chinese undertakings. The ap-
proach of the current European Commission will encourage Eu-
ropean undertakings to pay more attention to anti-dumping
proceedings. They should verify whether the Chinese undertak-
ings comply with the criteria laid down by the European Com-
mission. In particular, the European undertakings should take
care to ensure that any significant distortion due to the previous
Chinese State-controlled system is not affecting the commercial
activities of the Chinese undertaking. Such examination eventu-
ally may lead to the initiation of an anti-subsidy action against
China. The new European approach allows some Chinese un-
dertakings involved in anti-dumping proceedings to obtain more
favorable treatment from the European Commission with regard
to their defense, which will no longer be collective but individ-
ual.
These improvements, however, are being implemented
gradually (on a case-by-case basis depending on the undertak-
ing's situation). Most Chinese undertakings still are subject to
the traditional "no-market economy" treatment. Until now, the
new measures implemented by the European Community have
mainly profited undertakings with foreign-owned capital or joint
ventures. It should be noted that the "full" market-economy
anti-dumping procedure will only apply to all Chinese undertak-
ings after the fifteen-year transition period. This is a provision of
both the bilateral agreement between China and the European
Community and the bilateral agreement between China and the
United States.
B. Anti-dumping: China's Turn?
Anti-dumping practice in China is relatively new. In 1994,
China promulgated the Foreign Trade Law of the People's Re-
public of China13 ("Foreign Trade Law"). Articles 29 and 30 of
the Foreign Trade Law provide that the State may adopt neces-
13. Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China (1994).
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sary safeguarding measures if the products or its domestic pro-
ducers suffer serious injury or threat of injury due to an increase
in the importation of products. Also, the State may institute any
necessary counter-measures if the relevant domestic industry suf-
fers substantial injury or threat of injury because products are
being imported at a price that is less than the normal value. This
is the first time that Chinese laws have mentioned provisions
about anti-dumping. On March 25, 1997, Anti-dumping and
Anti-subsidy Regulations of the People's Republic of China 4
("Anti-Dumping Regulations") were promulgated by the State
Council and became effective. The Anti-Dumping Regulations
introduced, for the first time, clear anti-dumping rules. The rel-
evant provisions in the Anti-Dumping Regulations are Articles 3
to 35. The Anti-Dumping Regulations closely follow the princi-
ples of the WTO anti-dumping rules. The Foreign Trade Law
and the Anti-Dumping Regulations constitute the major legal
framework of Chinese anti-dumping legislation. Since their in-
troduction, China's legislation on anti-dumping has developed.
On October 27, 1999, the Chinese State Economic and Trade
Commission ("SETC") promulgated Hearing Rules of the State
Economic and Trade Commission Concerning Injury to Indus-
try,' 5 and on June 2, 2000, MOFTEC promulgated Provisional
Hearing Rules of the MOFTEC Concerning Anti-dumping Inves-
tigation. 16
In accordance with the Anti-Dumping Regulations, Chinese
producers and related organizations may initiate proceedings.
In special circumstances, MOFTEC may initiate an anti-dumping
proceeding after consultation with SETC if there is sufficient evi-
dence to justify the existence of a causal link between the dump-
ing and the injury suffered. In practice, Chinese producers, act-
ing on behalf of a Chinese industry that considers itself injured
or threatened by dumped imports, usually lodge the complaint.
The Chinese anti-dumping system is generally administered
by two agencies: MOFTEC, which determines whether dumping
has occurred, and SETC, which investigates whether a domestic
14. Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Regulations, Mar. 25, 1997 (P.R.C.), translated
in 5 FOREIGN TRADE L. 800 (1997).
15. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GUOWUYUAN GONGBAO [GAZETTE OF THE
STAET COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], Feb. 29, 2000, at 13-15.
16. ZHONGGUO WAISHANG Touzi ZHENGCE KUAIXUN [EXPRESS OF FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT POLICY IN CHINA], Sept. 10, 2000, at 19.
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industry is materially injured by alleged dumped imports. If the
dumping and injury to the Chinese domestic industry is found to
have occurred, a decision to impose anti-dumping duties will be
made by the Customs Rules Committee of the State Council
("Customs Committee"). The Customs Committee makes its de-
cisions on the recommendations of MOFTEC and SETC and the
findings of the investigations carried out by the General Admin-
istration of Customs ("GAC"). All proceedings (including re-
sponses to questionnaires, hearings, etc.) are conducted in Chi-
nese. Proceedings may last twelve to eighteen months.
Some of the principal issues in an anti-dumping proceeding
are the determination of normal value, injury, and causation. In
order to determine whether dumping has occurred, MOFTEC
investigates whether the imports have been sold at "less than
normal value." In accordance with the Anti-Dumping Regula-
tions, the normal value will be determined according to a "com-
parable price" of the "same or similar" products on the domestic
market of the export country. If there is not a comparable price
on the domestic market of the export country, the normal value
will be a "comparable price" of the "same or similar" products
exported to a third country or the "cost of the same or similar
product plus reasonable profit." In practice, normal value may
be established on the basis of the domestic sales prices provided
by exporters, as long as the data is reliable. In the investigation
on the dumping of imported newsprint from the United States,
Canada, and the Republic of Korea, some of the data supplied
was not used by MOFTEC, because it was considered to be in-
complete and insufficient. Instead, MOFTEC calculated the
normal value on the basis of the "cost of the same or similar
product plus reasonable profit." In the anti-dumping case
against polyester fabric imported from South Korea, MOFTEC
decided to use the sales information and cost in the domestic
market supplied by one exporter to determine the normal value
applicable. The normal value may also be established on the ba-
sis of the "best available facts" if an interested party fails to pro-
vide complete information, or if he cannot provide any evidence
or supporting documents such as sale contract, invoice, or if he
provides false information, etc.
In accordance with the Anti-Dumping Regulations, injury
includes "material injury or the threat of material injury" caused
by dumped imports to the established Chinese industry or a "ma-
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terial impediment" to a Chinese industry not yet established.
The following four items are examined when determining
whether a dumped product has caused injury to a domestic in-
dustry: (i) the quantity of the dumped product, including the
total amount of the dumped product or its increased amount as
compared to the same or similar product in China, or the
probability of a large increase, (ii) the price of the dumped
product, including the price decreases in the dumped product,
or the impact of the price of the dumped product on the price
for the same or similar product in China, (iii) the impact of the
dumped product on domestic industries, and (iv) the produc-
tion capacity, export capacity, and stockpiles of the dumped
product in the country of export. The Anti-Dumping Regula-
tions do not provide clear provisions on the causation between
dumping and injury, but it is nonetheless essential to prove the
existence of such causation. In order to ensure that injury is not
attributed to the dumping of products by mistake, other factors
may be considered, including whether the imports from other
countries are sold at dumped prices, changes in demand,
changes in the patterns of consumption, product quality, unfair
competition and force majeure.
In accordance with Article 20 of the Anti-Dumping Regula-
tions, if an interested party fails to provide relevant information,
the decision may be made on the basis of available facts. Accord-
ingly, depending on the information provided by exporters of
the interested country, the anti-dumping duties imposed on ex-
porters may vary. For example, in the newsprint case, the anti-
dumping duties for non-cooperating Korean companies were set
at 55%, while an anti-dumping duty for the cooperating Korean
producers was set at only 9%.
On December 10, 1997, MOFTEC decided to investigate the
dumping of imported newsprint from the United States, Ca-
nada, and the Republic of Korea. This was China's first anti-
dumping case of imported goods since the Anti-Dumping Regu-
lations became effective. As of February 9, 2001, seven anti-
dumping investigations have been initiated by MOFTEC. Com-
panies from Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan,
Netherlands, Russia, South Korea, Thailand, and the United
States are the focus of the investigations. The investigated prod-
ucts cover newsprint, silicon steel, polyester fabric, cold-rolled
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stainless steel sheet, acrylic esters, carrene (or
dichloromethane), and polystyrene.
Before December 10, 1999, there were no Western Euro-
pean companies involved in anti-dumping proceedings. On De-
cember 10, 1999, the date of initiation of anti-dumping proceed-
ing against acrylic esters originating in Japan, Germany, and the
United States, the German company, BASF Aktiengesellschaft,
together with its related companies, participated in the investiga-
tion into the alleged dumping of esters of acrylic acid products.
This was the first European company to be the subject of one of
China's anti-dumping investigations. On December 20, 2000, an
anti-dumping proceeding against carrene (or dichloromethane)
originating in Great Britain, the Netherlands, France, Germany
and so on was initiated. It is true that compared to Australia, the
European Union, or the United States, up until now China has
initiated relatively few anti-dumping cases against foreign im-
ports. After China's accession to the WTO, the situation will cer-
tainly change. How will China continue to implement anti-
dumping rules? Is there a risk of abuse of these measures? How
will the legislature deal with these issues? It will certainly be im-
portant for European companies to understand China's attitude
towards anti-dumping measures and their legal reinforcement.
Up until now, China's attitude towards anti-dumping mea-
sures has been prudent for two reasons. First, China has had
little experience in anti-dumping investigations. As mentioned
above, anti-dumping investigations in China began in December
1997. An anti-dumping investigation is very complex and to date
very few Chinese have the relevant expertise. In addition, Chi-
nese central governments underwent significant reform several
years ago, so the officials in charge of anti-dumping investiga-
tions were relatively few and far between. Second, even though
the Chinese anti-dumping rules are consistent with the WTO
rules, their implementation has been a difficult and sensitive is-
sue.
Anti-dumping, however, is becoming one of the key issues
in the Europe-China trade relationship. Both the Chinese gov-
ernment and industries have been paying close attention to
these measures. It is worth noting that the Chinese government
has issued several decrees providing that anti-dumping measures
are normal measures under market economy and that they are
allowed under the WTO rules. This seems to imply that China
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will actually use anti-dumping measures after accession to the
WTO.
It should be noted that in a recent anti-dumping case
brought by China's State-owned steel company, the defendants,
two Russian steel companies, Novolipetsk Iron & Steel Corpora-
tion ("Novolipetsk") and Viz Stal Ltd., successfully defended
their case. China's trade ministries reduced Novolipetsk's pre-
liminary duties from 11% to 6% and eliminated the 43% prelim-
inary duties imposed on Viz Stal Ltd.
Chinese industries are also becoming more and more famil-
iar with and supportive of anti-dumping measures. The fact that
Chinese enterprises have become more active in cooperating
with the European Commission in European anti-dumping pro-
ceedings against China is just one example. China's first anti-
dumping duties imposed on foreign imports have made others
understand at least that it is a measure that exists and that the
Chinese are ready to use it. A dozen anti-dumping petitions
have been filed with MOIFTEC as of June 2000.
At the same time, the Chinese legal framework is currently
undergoing further development. Indeed, China is now chang-
ing its legislation on anti-dumping. An anti-dumping law, in-
tended to replace the present Anti-Dumping Regulations, cur-
rently is being drafted. The future anti-dumping law will be
adopted by the People's National Congress and will concern
only anti-dumping matters, which is different from the current
situation, where a single regulation covers anti-dumping and
anti-subsidy. The new law is expected to have more detailed pro-
visions consistent with the WTO's anti-dumping rules. Although
it still is difficult to gauge the consequences of the new anti-
dumping rules, the implication is that China is making efforts to
meet international standards in order to apply its anti-dumping
legislation in a more pragmatic and transparent manner.
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